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Post Hurricane Katrina-Rita Planning, Recovery and Resiliency 
New Orleans, Louisiana 2005-2011:  Faith + Fortitude + Plans = Resurrection 
 
James R. Amdal 
University of New Orleans Transportation Institute 
jamdal@uno.edu 
 
Pierce Lewis, a world renowned geographer and author, famously described New 
Orleans as “The Impossible but Inevitable City”1.   The storms of 2005 emphatically 
proved his point. In the ensuing years, New Orleans has proved its resiliency as a 
city and as a people. Today, it is back after overcoming seemingly insurmountable 
odds. Some say the city is better than before. That is for history to decide, but the 
post-Katrina / Rita recovery of New Orleans is a long and drawn out tale of trial, 
tribulation and, ultimately, triumph. This is my personal account of the rebirth of 
New Orleans’ as a work in progress. 
 
As a resident of New Orleans for the past 30 years, a Katrina evacuee, a member of 
multiple post-disaster recovery planning teams, as well as the long serving 
Chairman of the Central Business District Historic Districts Landmark Commission, I 
have a unique perspective on these storms and the resultant planning processes 
that were used in the city’s recovery.  I also have first-hand experience with both 
processes and projects that have become central to New Orleans’ recovery during 
our post-disaster reconstruction.  
 
Since the focus of this paper is urban resiliency, I will discuss its role both  in our 
history and in our recent recovery.  I will conclude with a brief overview of New 
Orleans in late 2011.  I will also answer the following questions in the context of our 
continuing saga:  How did New Orleans originally use resiliency as it grew and 
developed?  How did the 2005 Hurricanes affect Louisiana and New Orleans?  How 
did the country, the state and the city respond to the massive destruction?  How was 
resiliency incorporated into the plans for NO’s reconstruction and repopulation?  
What lessons have we learned in the intervening years? 
 
Given our unique geography, on a deltaic plain next to the Mississippi River, with 
low elevations and in a flood-prone area, citizens of New Orleans originally built 
raised buildings on “high ground” in anticipation of annual floods. Low lying areas of 
the city were avoided until the later part of the 1800s. This is an early example of 
our forefathers’ appreciation of urban resiliency: they built appropriate buildings in 
appropriate places. 
 
Soon after New Orleans was founded in 1718, owners of upriver plantations, 
citizens of small river towns, as well as residents of New Orleans started building 
earthen levees along the banks of the Mississippi River to protect themselves and 
                                                        
1 Lewis, P.  (1973). New Orleans: The Making of an Urban Landscape.  Santa Fe, NM: Center For 
American Places, (1,2):pg.19 
their property from the river’s annual floods.  These earthen levees offered little 
protection from hurricanes and were overtopped or breached during periods of 
high water, but they did offer some protection under normal river conditions. These 
primitive forms of flood protection, although strengthened and raised over the 
years, still retain their vital function today, although their stability remains a worry 
to some. 
 
Starting in the late 1890’s things in New Orleans began to change in a rather 
remarkable manner. The Sewerage and Water Board of the City of New Orleans 
(SWB) began constructing a world-renowned drainage system using massive pumps 
(the patented Woods Screw Pumps were used worldwide but they were invented by 
a SWB engineer in the early 1900s), pump stations and outfall canals to drain the 
city and “dewater” it’s low lands to increase the city’s buildable area.  This was the 
first large scale attempt to “beat Mother Nature” in New Orleans, but it would not be 
the last. 
 
 
 
 
In large part, before technology “triumphed Mother Nature”, our forefathers got it 
right. They built where the city was most naturally resilient, on our naturally high 
ground. An 1878 map by Civil Engineer T. S. Hardee shows the City of New Orleans 
with 200,000 residents confined to the “Sliver on the River”.  This area suffered only 
minor flooding from Katrina. Areas labeled “cypress swamp” on this and earlier 
maps include present day neighborhoods including Lakeview, most of Gentilly, NO 
East, Broadmoor and the Lower 9. During Katrina, these neighborhoods received the 
worst flooding given their naturally low elevations. Note that the unflooded areas on 
the post-Katrina map are almost identical to the populated areas of New Orleans on 
the 1878 map.  Our historic neighborhoods and their flood conscious architecture 
played a major part in New Orleans’ resiliency because they weathered the storm 
with minimal damage.  They were the first areas to repopulate and today have the 
highest real estate values. Pre-Katrina, the real estate maxim was “Location-
Location-Location”.  Immediately after Katrina it became “Elevation-Elevation-
Elevation.”  
A Baldwin Woods under a Woods Screw Pump 
Image source: www.nola.com 
 1878 Map of New Orleans: T. S. Hardee 
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After Hurricane Betsy devastated New Orleans as a Category 4 storm in 1965, the US 
Army Corps of Engineers was directed by Congress to build an extensive flood 
protection system around New Orleans. This system was comprised of higher and 
stronger earthen levees and massive concrete floodwalls.  Unfortunately this flood 
protection system was still not complete when Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005 and 
is still incomplete today, although it is almost finished.  With these manmade 
interventions, citizens in New Orleans assumed they were safe and secure… until 
the flaws of this system were tragically revealed by Katrina’s floodwaters. 
 
So what was Hurricane Katrina? First, it was a 
massive Category 3 storm with winds in excess 
of 125 mph. Katrina impacted the entire 
Central Gulf Coast: Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama and Florida; not just New Orleans and 
southern LA. While the Mississippi Gulf Coast 
was especially hard hit by Katrina’s winds and 
30’ storm surges, 80% of New Orleans flooded 
from breaches in our federally designed and 
constructed flood protection system. All 
The Twin Spans over Lake Pontchartrain 
Image Source: gatewayno.com 
utilities and telecommunications systems failed. All surface transportation systems 
were flooded. These systems were basically impassable for months and some were 
completely destroyed: i.e. the Twin Spans bridge over Lake Pontchartrain.  
However, the Port of New Orleans reopened after 13 days, thanks to access 
provided by the Mississippi River. Katrina became the most destructive and costliest 
natural / manmade disaster in the history of the US due to its immense size and its 
destructive storm surges.   
 
But for New Orleans, Katrina was both a natural and manmade disaster. It was just 
made worse by our natural topography and our protection systems. New Orleans is 
a natural bowl ringed at its edges by either earthen levees or floodwalls.  Roughly 
50% of the greater NO region is below sea level.    
 
The map shown 
below indicates with 
the dark blue arrows 
where the levees 
were breached (50 
sites total) during 
Katrina. The city’s 
naturally low 
elevation and the 
failed flood 
protection system 
was a fatal 
combination. The 
red areas on the map 
indicate the 
locations where 
deaths occurred.  A 
computer generated 
simulation of the 
Katrina flooding in 
the New Orleans 
region is available 
at: www.nola.com/ 
katrina/graphics/ 
flashflood.swf. 
 
Hurricane Rita hit just 3 weeks later, with winds estimated at 120 mph. It caused 
more coastal erosion, a second evacuation for impacted areas, localized flooding and 
additional structural failures.  While Rita’s impact was most severe in southwestern 
LA and Texas, New Orleans still suffered surges in excess of 8 ft. and breaches 
occurred in some provisionally-repaired levees.  These failures caused a second 
flood (2’-3’) in certain neighborhoods. Rita added “insult to injury” in a horrific 
replay of Katrina for New Orleans. 
Image Source: www.nola.com 
Horrifying images of Katrina’s destruction in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast 
were broadcast via cable networks and television in late August and early 
September, 2005. However, today, the enormity of these storms and their 
destructive powers is still hard to imagine. By most recent accounts, these storms in 
combination caused over $200B in losses and 1,800 deaths; 200,000 homes and 
18,000 businesses were destroyed; some parishes were 100% destroyed; 19 of 64 
parishes in LA were severely affected. LA lost over 100 square miles of coastal 
wetlands, a 50 yr. natural equivalent.  New Orleans sustained 57% of LA’s total loss. 
Access to New Orleans was severely restricted for 5 weeks. Most importantly, 
roughly 100,000 residents have not yet returned to New Orleans.  Six years later, the 
images and statistics are still shocking.  In some areas of New Orleans evidence of 
the storm’s damage remains today.  
 
Given the devastation to the city and to Louisiana as a whole, what did we do to 
respond?   Gov. Kathleen Blanco created the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) in 
mid-October, 2005.  The LRA became key to the state’s and city’s recovery because it 
was designated as the administrator of all federal recovery funds ($10.4B) allocated 
to Louisiana by the US Congress. The distribution of these monies was dependent on 
individual recovery plans submitted by all 19 affected parishes.  In both Louisiana 
and in New Orleans, creating a comprehensive and inclusive recovery plan became a 
long and difficult process.  This was, in part, due to a strong sense of being rooted to 
the history, the culture and the communities of the state and the neighborhoods in 
New Orleans. This unique characteristic was common in citizens that were 
devastated by Katrina, Rita or both. This “rootedness” often clashed with recovery 
planning processes that attempted to limit the areas that would be repopulated.  
 
Almost simultaneously, in New Orleans, Mayor C. Ray Nagin created Bring New 
Orleans Back (BNOB), a 17 member committee of city leaders, to respond to the 
devastation and deliver a city-wide Recovery Plan within 90 days.  This was the first 
impossible deadline imposed on the planning process. It was unfortunately not the 
last.   
 
In order to maximize citizen input, 
BNOB was organized into committees 
and subcommittees. They included: 
Land Use; Infrastructure (flood 
protection, public transit, criminal 
justice); Culture; Education; Health and 
Human Services; Economic 
Development; Government 
Effectiveness. These committees held 
hundreds of individual meetings over a 
3 month period. In my opinion, this was 
the beginning of an “illness” that befell 
thousands in New Orleans.  I call it 
Image Source: Amdal 2006                                                   “planningitis”.   
Citizens felt obligated to attend hundreds, if not thousands, of meetings citywide or 
in their individual neighborhoods regarding recovery and post-disaster rebuilding.  
In some neighborhoods these meetings continue today.  
 
However, significant projects resulted from these early BNOB meetings and the 
resultant recovery plans which grew from them.  As a result of BNOB and its citizens 
input, pump stations were moved to the lakefront and the Mississippi River Gulf  
Outlet (a 1960’s era manmade shipping shortcut to the Gulf of Mexico) was closed. 
Equally important, the Corps of Engineers strengthened our levees and floodwalls, 
installed surge protecting floodgates at the lakefront, and are now in the final stages 
of completing the federally mandated Flood Protection System.  All of these 
decisions were made to address the city’s resilience to future storms. 
 
Soon after the formation of the LRA and BNOB, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a 
Washington DC Not –For-Profit was invited to New Orleans to brainstorm with 
community, business, and academic leaders on the future of New Orleans. The ULI 
team was composed of professionals from both the public and private sector 
including planners, landscape architects, mayors, developers, finance experts and 
public administrators. After a week of analyzing New Orleans’ situation, the ULI 
team prepared a Recovery Plan based on their cumulative experience and expertise. 
Their recommendations included: shrinking the city’s footprint; strategically 
planning for a reduced population; converting heavily damaged neighborhoods into 
open space. They were the first group to suggest that neighborhoods needed to 
prove their validity in order to participate in the city’s recovery efforts. They also 
suggested a four month moratorium on issuing building permits.  
 
All of these ideas encompassed various aspects of “resiliency”: i.e. to prevent the 
repopulation of the areas most at risk.  Although reasonable and professionally 
sound, ULI’s concepts created confusion, fear, and abject rejection due to their 
implied impacts. Most of their recommendations were flatly and vocally rejected. 
Their plan and its recommendations also raised thorny tangential issues: the rights 
of property owners remained unanswered; the rootedness of many neighborhoods 
was ignored; the idea of replacing residential properties with green space / 
retention ponds. This plan also seemed to pit one neighborhood against another.  
Citizens asked: What is a viable neighborhood? According to whose standards? Who 
decides?  These were all valid questions with no answers, at least at the time.  
Due to political realities, most of the ULI recommendations were rejected almost 
immediately by the Mayor. He chose instead to adopt a market-driven approach to 
redevelopment and repopulation. With this decision, the idea of imposing terms and 
conditions on redevelopment and repopulation was dropped from civic discourse. 
 
But the community knew what citizens could do on their own.  Almost immediately 
after returning to New Orleans, citizens realized that they could provide immediate 
help to the city in a multitude of ways. This was and continues to be an important 
part of the city’s resiliency: its people and the diverse roles they have played in the 
city’s recovery and resurrection can’t be over emphasized.  
Image Source: cleanno.org 
 
The Katrina Krewe, a 
knockoff of Mardi Gras 
terminology, voluntarily 
cleaned the streets, parks, 
and medians throughout 
the city. Civic volunteerism, 
from locals as well as 
volunteer groups from 
around the US and abroad, 
became a necessary 
response to the scale of the 
damage and pace of the 
government’s response at 
all levels. Citizens pitched in 
where necessary to 
enhance or accelerate 
efforts being made by the 
city, private contractors,                
the National Guard and 
others.   
 
Non-Governmental Organizations (i.e. Habitat for Humanity; Global Green and 
countless others) came to New Orleans to spearhead individual projects.  The 
Musicians Village in the Upper 9th Ward is just one example of their lasting 
contribution. This project is now occupied as permanent housing and recently 
opened the Ellis Marsalis Center for Music as a multi-purpose arts facility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Image Source: Amdal 2007 
When the final BNOB Report was released in January 2006, the citizens reacted with 
“Fear and Loathing”.  In response, Recovery Steering Committees were formed in 
most, if not all, neighborhoods. They were grouped into planning districts based on 
pre-Katrina designations made by the City Planning Commission. Their primary 
mission was to prove their neighborhood’s viability and value. The net result of the 
BNOB plan was a renewed sense of worth and purpose for neighborhood 
organizations city-wide. But they also realized they needed professional help to 
develop “credible” recovery plans.  And at that time, no one knew how that help was 
going to be provided. During deliberations with FEMA in early 2006, it was 
determined that FEMA funding could not be used for recovery planning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Image Source: www.nola.com 
 
So, with this decision, a major question remained unanswered.  Who would provide 
the needed professional resources to develop individual neighborhood recovery 
plans and how would they get paid?  Paul Lambert, a Miami based housing expert 
under contract to the New Orleans City Council, came up with the answers. He had 
past experience in recovery efforts in Dade County Florida after Hurricane Andrew 
hit Miami in 1992. He knew that unspent CDBG funds were available for recovery 
planning in the “wet” neighborhoods of New Orleans, just as they were used in 
Florida. “Dry” neighborhoods were ineligible. He formed a team of local and national 
professionals and they began work in early 2006 on the 46 “wet” neighborhoods 
using CDBG funds. The areas shown with black borders were included in the “wet” 
neighborhoods.  
The principal 
planner responsible 
for what became 
known as the 
Lambert Plan was 
my friend, Alfredo 
Sanchez with 
Miami-based 
Bermello Ajamil & 
Partners. He and I 
worked with the 
District 5 Recovery 
Steering Committee 
and citizen 
advocates on their 
Neighborhood 
Rebuilding Plan for 
most of 2006.  I 
originally 
volunteered to 
assist the District 5 
Recovery Steering 
Committee before 
the Lambert Plan 
was even 
underway.   
 
 
This collection of neighborhoods is located immediately city-side of the infamous 
17th Street drainage canal, which ruptured during Katrina. This area flooded with 
over 10 feet of water and many homes were filled with 6 feet of mud and debris. 
District 5 (light olive color in map’s upper left) was basically wiped out.  
 
 
  Image Source: City of New Orleans Neighborhood Rebuilding Plan report 
Today these neighborhoods (7 in total) are roughly 70% to 90% repopulated with 
both newly built or rehabbed houses. Harrison Avenue, District 5’s commercial 
corridor, is now thriving. Hynes Elementary School is in the final stages of 
completion as a new facility on its original site. But this has only happened after 
years of dedicated work by citizen activists, strong neighborhood organizations, and 
significant leadership provided by numerous religious institutions and their 
affiliated schools. The importance of the religious community of all faiths cannot be 
over emphasized.   
 
The individual neighborhood organizations joined together to form the District 5 
Recovery Steering Committee while the Mayor created the BNOB and the Governor 
created the LRA.  The District 5 Recovery Steering Committee created over 72 
different categories for citizen involvement. Meeting at least once every two weeks 
for a period of several months, these committees added important citizen input into 
the overall planning process. However, this highly regimented organization, its 
member organizations’ collective history of advocacy as well as their  relative 
affluence  were the keys to District 5’s recovery. Their track record made a real 
difference when it came time for civic mobilization and political action.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Image Source: St. Dominics       
  
 
 
 Image Source: St. Dominics 
 
The Lambert Plan incorporated 48 individual neighborhood rebuilding plans and 
was published as a 1200 page (11” x 17” color printed both sides) document. The 
total costs for its implementation were estimated at $4.4B.  Its projects were 
prioritized based on when they should be implemented. This plan represented an 
incredible effort on the part of the respective neighborhood leaders, citizens, as well 
as the planning team to devise a recovery / rebuilding plan for the flooded parts of 
the city. However, the Lambert Plan did not and could not address those 
neighborhoods that did not flood since they were not “distressed” as defined by 
federal regulations. Therefore it could not be used as the city’s Recovery Plan to 
access funds from the LRA.  Thus, the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) was born. 
So what was the Unified New Orleans Plan? It was a privately financed planning 
process that attempted to divorce the planning process from “politics as usual”.  In 
reality it just replaced one form of politics with another.  UNOP included all 
neighborhoods in the city, both wet and dry, and sought to incorporate all previous 
plans into its process and product. These included the BNOB, Lambert 
Neighborhood Rebuilding Plans as well as independent recovery plans created by 
third party advocates, as well as LA Speaks, the state’s recovery plan. Therefore, it 
could, and eventually was, used by the City to access recovery monies from the LRA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Image Source: UNOP 
 
Why did it succeed?  In large part, UNOP’s Community Congresses were the key to 
its success. There were three, each was an eight hour session held on a Saturday. 
Thousands of citizens participated via hi-tech communication with each other and 
the Congress facilitators during these meetings. An interactive technique helped 
convince the LRA that UNOP was the city’s recovery plan, based on input from 
residents and those still in the diaspora.  Citizens participated, regardless of where 
they were living at the time, and reached consensus on goals, objectives, policies and 
projects.  This was UNOP’s most important contribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
Image Source: UNOP 
UNOP analyzed city-wide systems as well as all 72 individual neighborhoods with a 
particular emphasis on risk management. This map illustrates the depth of flooding 
within the City as established by aerial photography. As you can clearly see, the 
“sliver on the river” was spared most of the flooding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Image Source: www.katrina.esl.lsu.edu 
 
UNOP also attempted to forecast repopulation using a variety of indicators: utility 
hookups, mail deliveries, permit activity by classification, etc... This proved to be 
very problematic and unreasonable, in the end. However, it was one way of 
approaching an uncertain future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Image Source: UNOP 
 
UNOP also made city-wide assessments of systems and selected both projects and 
programs to be included in its final list of recommendations. These were broadly 
prioritized in time (immediate, mid-term, long-term) as they had been in previous 
recovery and rebuilding plans. But it was the community engagement process, not 
the product,  that sold UNOP to the people of New Orleans, the elected and 
appointed officials. The costs associated with UNOP’s policies and programs were in 
excess of $14B, given its incorporation of all neighborhoods in the city and their 
individual needs. 
 
A significant part of UNOP was its planning for the “dry” neighborhoods. In 
approaching these particular neighborhoods, it became clear that their damage was 
economic, not physical. I served on the District 1 Recovery Steering Committee 
which incorporated both the Central Business District and the French Quarter. 
When these two distinctly different neighborhoods were combined as District 1 and 
began meeting, they soon realized that they shared a common challenge: the 
perception that New Orleans was a continuing disaster with no future. This meant 
severely reduced visitor numbers (tourists and conventioneers) and an extremely 
altered economy. However, by working together, their individual interests were 
joined in mutually reinforcing plans, programs and projects that benefitted both 
neighborhoods as well as the city. These included multiple marketing and 
promotional campaigns by New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, the Visitors and  
Convention Bureau and many others.  Their overall goal was to restore tourism so 
that our economy could recover and grow. Individually and collectively these efforts 
were very successful.  As just one indicator, there are now 300 more restaurants 
operating in New Orleans than before Katrina.  
Image Source: UNOP 
 
 
For District 1, UNOP proposed a concentration of performing arts venues at a prime 
intersection in the CBD. “Broadway South” is now being realized at the upper end of 
Canal Street, the traditional commercial corridor in the CBD. The 1927 Saenger 
Theater, an entertainment icon for the City, is being renovated to recapture its 
historic past while employing cutting edge technologies for the performing arts. 
Across the street, the 1947 Joy Theater is also being renovated for live 
performances. A new $70 mixed use development, primarily residential, has also 
just been approved by the City Council and groundbreaking will begin this year. All 
of this development has only begun in the last twenty four months.  
     Image Source: Amdal 2010 
 
UNOP’s District 1 plan also envisioned specific nodes of development and particular 
characteristics per project. A part of bio-medical research / bio-technology sector 
was recently realized with the opening of the Bio-Innovation Center, a $60M 
incubator for research and development in the medical sciences. Also included in 
this emerging economic sector is a new Health Sciences Center that includes a new 
LSU Teaching Hospital and a new VA Hospital, currently being built at a cost of $2B 
in portions of Mid-City, a neighborhood just lakeside of the CBD. These new 
hospitals have been a source of heated debate for the last several years in the 
community at-large but are now under construction.  
 
 
 
Image Source:  Amdal 2010 
 
Although UNOP was expansive in its scale and cost, remarkably much of it is now 
being realized. On just one upper CBD corridor, a new $45M streetcar line is being 
built, with 100% federal funds, while within 3 blocks of its route over $1.3B of new 
development has been planned or built since Katrina.  These include a newly 
renovated Superdome, the soon to be reopened Hyatt Regency Hotel, the Benson 
Tower and the Saratoga Apartments, a 1950s office building being converted to 150 
units of downtown rental housing. The CBD’s first grocery store opened in mid-
October, 2011. Most of these projects have only happened in the last couple of years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Image Source: Amdal 2010   
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I began documenting New Orleans’ recovery planning process in the spring of 2007, 
when Professor Isabel Maret of the University of Montreal and her French associates 
Phillipe Jamet, of the French Embassy in Washington and Professor  Frederique 
Vincent of ISIGE brought 20 graduate students in municipal engineering to visit New 
Orleans post-Katrina. At that time, Bob Hebert, a columnist for the NYT’s, noted that 
New Orleans was like the fairy tale character Humpty Dumpty who fell off the wall 
and nobody knew how to put him back together again. At the time, his assessment 
about the city was correct “A great American cultural center like New Orleans was 
all but washed away, and no one knows how to put it back together again.” (Bob 
Herbert, NYT 2/22/07). I’m glad to report we have figured a lot out in the last 4 
years. 
Conceptual Map: Development Dynamics  
Post-Katrina New Orleans 
Image Source: Amdal 2010 
 
Within the Central Business District and the French Quarter traditional 
development patterns have been augmented by new centers of investment activity. 
The Superdome and its immediate environs are seeing over $800M invested in 
renovations and new construction within a 4 block radius. The Convention Center 
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Image Source: makeitrightnola.org 
and the Central Area Riverfront are also seeing additions to their traditional 
offerings: a new cruise ship terminal, expanded convention facilities and extensive 
renovations to Riverwalk, a specialty retail center overlooking the Mississippi River. 
The French Quarter is thriving within its historic context and “toute ensemble”.  
 
However, the Lower 9 is still struggling after 6 years of planning, advocacy, and 
major investments by foundations and support organizations. The Make It Right 
Foundation is in the process of building 150 environmentally friendly homes in the 
Lower 9 which was basically destroyed by Katrina’s floodwaters. The new houses 
are elevated 8 feet and feature Energy-Star windows and appliances, formaldehyde-
free cabinets and paints free of VOCs. The ultimate success of this initiative is still up 
in the air in spite of its laudable intent and significant investment. Retail and 
institutional anchors have been slow to reemerge after the storm however, it was 
recently announced that a new 25,000 square foot grocery would be built in the 
neighborhood to serve area residents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treme, a historic neighborhood founded by “free men of color” in the 1840s, is 
hoping the redevelopment of the Claiborne elevated highway (I-10) into a grade 
level boulevard will help restore the once thriving Claiborne Avenue mixed use 
corridor. This is a direct outgrowth of both plans, however, at this time, the project 
remains a vision, not a reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image Source: nola.com 
The Regional Planning Commission, the Metropolitan Planning Organization for the 
New Orleans region, in partnership with the LA Department of Transportation and 
Development and the Federal Highway Administration created the Submerged 
Roads Program to specifically fund the repair New Orleans’ major arterial roadways 
post-flood. Before the storm, local roads were not great but after the flood they were 
horrible. They also were deteriorating at an alarming rate, due to the influx of salt 
water with the flooding. This program has been able to repair over 56 miles of 
roadways in the city and significantly add to the local bike path system by 
specifically designating bike routes within the newly reconstructed roadways. 
Finally, the Submerged Roads Program could not address the needs of the interior 
roadways; i.e. the streets of the neighborhoods. How these repairs will be funded 
remains another unanswered question.   
 
Image Source: Regional Planning Commission 
 
Attention has also been given to expanding options for mobility with a special 
emphasis on improving and enlarging alternative transportation systems: 
specifically for pedestrians, the mobility impaired and cyclists of all types and ages. 
Through a coordinated plan that addresses multiple needs throughout the city, 
we’ve grown our bicycle network from a meager 5 miles in 2004 to over 40 miles in 
2011. From 2010 to 2011 bicycle use increased 20%. The network includes bike 
lanes within roadways, sharrows as well as bike trails. In the coming months we will 
begin the construction of the Lafitte Greenway. This 3.1 mile project is converting an 
abandoned freight rail right-of-way into a multi-functional linear green space that 
will accommodate a variety of users: from toddlers to the elderly.  Walkers, cyclists, 
skateboarders, rollerblade aficionados as well as young families with strollers will 
use this new amenity.  This project, long a dream for a core constituency, is now 
being heralded as the ultimate urban renaissance: turning an abandoned industrial 
eyesore into a community asset.  When complete it will serve multiple 
neighborhoods along its path, from the French Quarter to Bayou St. John in Mid-City.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On another front, after the floods, elevating houses became a new “art” form, 
especially in neighborhoods that were built after WWII in newly developed areas 
within the city. These houses were typically “slab on grade” and present costly 
challenges for the homeowner and has created some visually disturbing results in 
many instances. The original elevation program provided up to $30K per residence 
for “house raising”.  This amount was recently found to be inadequate and was 
amended upwards to provide residents with the funds necessary to properly raise 
their homes. Another problem with this program was its timing. The original “Road 
Home” program that provided funds for rehab or reconstruction of damaged homes 
was awarded several years before the elevation program was activated. This 
complicated the entire rehab / reconstruction funding decision for homeowners. 
Equally troubling, abuses are now being reported of unqualified contractors being 
hired for these projects. Although paid through state administered programs, fraud 
claims are common and becoming more so. Finally, there are no design standards 
for ‘house raising” which can lead to unintended consequences. Many individual 
homes look slightly “out of place” in the context of neighboring houses and the 
overall streetscape.  
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Since Katrina, the USACOE (the Corps.) has spent over $14B upgrading, repairing 
and completing the New Orleans area storm protection system. This was and 
remains our most important resiliency component. One major project is the surge 
protection barrier recently built in Lake Borne at a cost of $1.1 B. When complete in 
2012, the projects undertaken by the Corps will provide protection for a CAT 3 
storm for the greater New Orleans region. However, many believe this system 
should offer protection from a CAT 5 storm but the costs are astronomical and 
currently this upgrade is not being pursued. These flood protection projects, as well 
as the rest of our recovery activities, have shielded the New Orleans region, in large 
part, from the economic ills currently afflicting the United States. We became an 
isolated bubble of reconstruction activity recovering from the storms of 2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relative to public education, by 2016, every public school student in New Orleans 
will be attending a new or renovated school, designed and constructed with 
resilience as a core requirement. This $2B rebuilding program is being administered 
by the Recovery School District, a state agency that replaced the highly politicized 
pre-Katrina Orleans School Board. An alternate program of charter schools, largely 
administered by parents and teachers, has proven extremely successful in post-
Katrina New Orleans, to the delight of local and national advocates. Fully 78% of 
today’s public school students are being educated in a charter school, making New 
Orleans a model for national public education reform. 
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Public housing has also been transformed post-Katrina into mixed income 
developments by an aggressive partnership between the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, the Housing Authority of New Orleans and a number of 
local and national private sector developers.  Before Katrina, more than 5,000 
families lived in public housing, but today only one-third have returned to the newly 
built replacements.  Former residents have mixed emotions about their new 
“neighborhoods” with some decrying the higher rents and utility bills. Others miss 
their former neighbors who have not returned. It remains to be seen if this “new 
model” of public housing will fare better than those they replaced. Only time will 
tell. 
  
Post-Katrina, New Orleans has become a hot spot for young entrepreneurs. Many 
were first drawn to the city by the disaster, but once becoming part of the 
community, many have stayed and prospered.  As a colleague noted during a UNOP 
District 1 Recovery Steering Committee Meeting, “these folks can be anywhere.” 
Their businesses are lap-top based, but they’ve chosen New Orleans due its limitless 
opportunities for growth and development. The Idea Village, a local Not- For-Profit 
founded in 2000, has emerged post-Katrina as a nexus for entrepreneurial 
initiatives.  
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Despite our post-storm recovery, long-standing problems still persist in New 
Orleans. Crime remains an on-going problem for residents and visitors alike. There 
exists today in the city over 48,000 blighted and/or vacant properties, both 
structures and lots, according to figures recently released by the Greater New 
Orleans Community Data Center. New Orleans ranks #2 in the US for  income 
disparity and the 2010 British Petroleum deep-water oil spill is still affecting the 
local and state’s economy.   
 
The post-Katrina recovery of New Orleans presents a unique opportunity for others 
to learn from our successes and failures.  Today New Orleans may be the best 
laboratory in the world for academic and applied research in the ever-expanding 
disciplines of disaster recovery and urban resilience. There exist countless avenues 
of investigation: from public health to economic revitalization.  New Orleans has 
demonstrated success, in spite of overwhelming odds, in neighborhoods throughout 
the city.  Each offers a unique perspective on disaster recovery at many levels:: the 
individual citizen, the neighborhood leader, and city, state or national policymakers.  
  
Resilience has many different faces in post-Katrina New Orleans: the physical, the 
social, the historic and the organizational. The city has excelled in each of these 
arenas: in some more than others, but all have been successful. New Orleans over 
the last six years has been revisioned, rebuilt and resurrected from the floodwaters 
of 2005. Post-Katrina New Orleans clearly has much to offer the international 
community in understanding and learning from our efforts in disaster recovery and 
urban resilience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
